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THE SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN YOUR CAR ACT: WILL IT 
ACTUALLY PROTECT YOU? 
Benjamin L. Bollinger* 
On July 21, 2015, in light of emerging technology involving 
autonomous driving vehicles, the United States Senate proposed 
Senate Bill 1806, or the Security and Privacy in Your Car Act, to 
address issues surrounding these technologies. The “SPY Car Act” 
attempts to address issues surrounding cybersecurity, data 
privacy, and hacking of autonomous driving vehicles. The Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation is currently 
analyzing the SPY Car Act. If enacted, this bill could pave the way 
for the autonomous driving vehicle industry to be effectively 
regulated. Although this bill has its shortcomings, it is a good start 
to the conversation regarding the privacy and security concerns 
associated with autonomous driving vehicles. 
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For most drivers who have sat steaming in rush hour traffic or 
wished they could catch up on work instead of driving in to the 
office, self-driving cars may be an enticing option. With the 
emergence of these vehicles, the concerns over vehicle safety, data 
security, data privacy, and regulation are at the forefront of the 
minds of industry and government actors. This Recent 
Development analyzes the Security and Privacy in Your Car Act 
(“SPY Car Act”), a bill before Congress that seeks to govern 
cybersecurity and privacy aspects of self-driving vehicles, and 
examines how this legislation will address the concerns 
surrounding this emerging technology. 
Autonomous driving vehicles, also known as self-driving 
vehicles, are on the verge of becoming an everyday sight on roads.1 
While these vehicles would definitely provide drivers with many 
advantages,2 they also come with considerable risks and liabilities.3 
                                                
* J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2018. I would 
like to thank Professor Anne Klinefelter and the North Carolina Journal of Law 
and Technology for all of their help with this article. 
 1 BI Intelligence, Ten Million Self-Driving Cars Will Be on the Road by 2020, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (June 15, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/report-10-
million-self-driving-cars-will-be-on-the-road-by-2020-2015-5-6 (stating that by 
the year 2020 there will be close to 10 million vehicles on the road that will have 
some sort of self-driving technology incorporated within the vehicle). 
 2 See Dan McLaughlin, 17 Ways Driverless Cars Could Change America, 
THE FEDERALIST (July 16, 2014), http://thefederalist.com/2014/07/16/17-ways-
driverless-cars-could-change-america/ (listing fewer car accidents, changing of 
traffic patterns, changing the insurance and legal culture, and changing the 
layout of cities as the many effects of self-driving vehicles). 
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Cybersecurity and privacy risks have the potential to delay, or even 
break, the self-driving vehicle industry.4 Although it may be the 
industry’s intention to put the safest and most reliable vehicles on 
the road, the federal government must implement regulations to 
protect consumers and govern this emerging and complex 
technology. 
Cybersecurity and data privacy are some of the most 
significant areas of concern arising from self-driving vehicles. 
These apprehensions stem from the knowledge that self-driving 
vehicles will rely on some combination of Internet-based 
communication systems to operate the vehicles without the control 
of a human driver. 5  Furthermore, because these vehicles will 
invariably be connected to the Internet, there are risks that the 
wireless connection could be breached and the vehicles’ operating 
system could be interfered with or sensitive personal data being 
transmitted over the connection could be stolen.6 
While it may seem that cybersecurity and data privacy are 
intermingled issues, they must be viewed as separate and distinct.7 
The SPY Car Act’s definition of cybersecurity includes differing 
elements that must be distinguished from the definition of data 
                                                                                                         
 3 See Tia Ghose, Self-Driving Cars: 5 Problems That Need Solutions, LIVE 
SCIENCE (May 14, 2015), http://www.livescience.com/50841-future-of-
driverless-cars.html. 
 4 RAND Corporation, AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 94 (2016) (stating that the privacy concerns surrounding 
autonomous vehicles “could potentially derail the business”). 
 5 Id. at XIX–XXII (explaining how these vehicles could potentially rely on 
“cloud-based resources,” “vehicle to vehicle” communication (“V2V”), “vehicle 
to infrastructure” communication (“V2I”), GPS technology, and “inertial 
navigation systems (“INS”). This report also states that software upgrades for 
the vehicle over the Internet may also pose problems for the industry. 
 6  Id. at 6. (stating “Internet-connected systems might be hacked by the 
malicious.”). 
 7 It is important to delineate the two terms because of the tendency to confuse 
them. A breach of cybersecurity can be viewed as a breach of privacy, and a 
breach of privacy can be viewed as a breach of cybersecurity. However, the SPY 
Car Act uses specific language to show what is included under each definition, 
and this Recent Development will adhere to those definitions. 
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privacy. 8  Cybersecurity is defined by the SPY Car Act as 
protection against hacking of all “entry points to the electronic 
systems of each motor vehicle.”9 “Entry points” into the vehicle 
are any wireless or wired connection through which “control 
signals” travel or a connection through which data can be 
“accessed directly or indirectly.”10 The SPY Car Act also relates 
cybersecurity to the protection of “software systems that can affect 
the driver’s control of the vehicle movement.”11 
Conversely, the SPY Car Act defines data privacy much more 
narrowly. Here, data privacy is limited to notice, transparency, 
consumer control, and limitation on the use of data collected by 
manufacturers.12 These definitions clearly delineate between the 
two terms. The definition of cybersecurity used in the SPY Car Act 
refers to two things: (1) the protection against malicious 
interference with the self-driving vehicle’s operability;13 and (2) 
unauthorized access to or interception of driving data.14 On the 
other hand, the definition of data privacy refers to what 
manufacturers can and cannot do with harvested driving data and 
the right of the consumers to that data.15 
                                                
 8 Security and Privacy in Your Car Act of 2015, S. 1806, 114th Cong. (2015). 
The SPY Car Act’s definition of cybersecurity can be split into two separate 
elements: protection against an attempt to take control of the vehicle’s driving 
ability and protection against stealing or intercepting of driving data. The data 
privacy definition speaks to the scenario where the manufacturer is mining data 
and what they can do with it and what rights the consumer has to the mining and 
use of the data. 
 9 Id. at 3. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 2. 
 12 Id. at 8–11. 
 13 This is evidenced by the inclusion of the “protection against hacking” 
language and while someone may hack driving data the Senate also includes that 
hacking can be unauthorized access to the “electronic controls” of the vehicle. 
See id. at 3. 
 14 This is evidenced by the inclusion of “unauthorized access to . . . driving 
data” in the definition of “hacking” and the “protection against hacking” 
provision and the “security of collected information” section of the 
cybersecurity standards portion. See Security and Privacy in Your Car Act of 
2015, S. 1806, 114th Cong. 3 (2015). 
 15 Id. at 8–11. 
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The difference between cybersecurity and data privacy is 
further illustrated by the differing risks of harm from breaches. An 
example of a cybersecurity breach is where a vehicle’s operating 
system is hacked.16 In such instances, a hacker may be able to “take 
over the brakes, engine, or other components of a person’s car.”17 
This is concerning because such breaches of security could result 
in serious bodily injury or death. However, in the event of a 
privacy breach, where a driver’s personal data are vulnerable, the 
consequences could have other impacts on the consumer.18 The 
data retained by vehicle manufacturers are so sensitive, if a 
consumer’s data privacy is breached and the information is 
transferred to an unauthorized third party, the third party could 
potentially track a consumer’s whereabouts, anticipate a 
consumer’s movements, or potentially implicate a consumer by 
leaking proof of illegal conduct based on a consumer’s 
movement. 19  This could lead to reputational harms, loss of 
employment, and loss of liberty.20 
Cybersecurity and privacy standards for self-driving vehicles 
are still evolving.21 The U.S. Department of Transportation has 
recognized the fact that no standards exist for self-driving vehicle 
                                                
 16 See Kevin Collier, How Easy is it to Hack A Self-Driving Car?, VOCATIV 
(June 29, 2016), http://www.vocativ.com/332734/driverless-car-hack/. 
 17 Tom Simonite, Your Future Self-Driving Car Will Be Way More Hackable, 
MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 26, 2016), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/546086/your-future-self-driving-car-will-
be-way-more-hackable/. See also Alex Hern, Car Hacking Is the Future— 
and Sooner Or Later You’ll Be Hit, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 28, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/28/car-hacking-future-self-
driving-security. 
 18 See infra note 48. 
 19 See generally Mathew Gillespie, Shifting Automotive Landscapes: Privacy 
and the Right to Travel in the Era of the Autonomous Motor Vehicles, 50 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 147 (2016) (discussing the potential privacy risks inherent in 
autonomous driving vehicles).  
 20 See Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy and Intelligent Transportation Technology, 
11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 151 (1995) (discussing how 
intelligent transportation technology can potentially affect the privacy rights of 
consumers). 
 21  U.S. Department of Transportation, FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES 
POLICY 21 (2016). 
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manufacturers to use to model their industry practices and that 
“more research is necessary before proposing a regulatory 
standard.” 22  The industry cannot mass-produce self-driving 
vehicles until industry standards and federal regulations exist.23 
These standards and regulations are important to mass-production 
because of the potential for widespread harm. 
In response to these concerns, the U.S. Congress proposed the 
SPY Car Act in July 2015.24 This Recent Development analyzes 
the provisions of the SPY Car Act with existing data privacy 
regulations and argues that the United States Senate has not 
completely addressed every issue pertaining to self-driving 
vehicles. Part II discusses the relevant law in the arena of privacy 
regulation. Part III elaborates on the SPY Car Act and the issues it 
addresses, such as “hacking,” “cybersecurity standards,” “cyber 
dashboard,” and “privacy standards,”25 with a particular focus on 
the privacy provisions. Part IV analyzes the privacy provisions of 
the SPY Car Act and whether a particular provision will help to 
reconcile privacy concerns. Finally, Part V suggests 
recommendations for how the SPY Car Act can be improved to 
better address the issue of privacy surrounding self-driving 
vehicles. 
II. RELEVANT PRIVACY LAW 
Before discussing relevant privacy law, it is important to note 
the federal entities that will play a pivotal role in governing 
vehicles of this nature. Because the regulation of these vehicles 
will involve two separate forms of governance, the actual vehicle 
itself and the Internet-based operational features, the SPY Car Act 
requires the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(“NHTSA”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to consult 
with each other before issuing any regulations.26 First, the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (“DOT”), through the NHTSA, 
                                                
 22 Id. 
 23 RAND, supra note 4. 
 24 Security and Privacy in Your Car Act of 2015, S. 1806, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 25 Id. at 3–11. 
 26 Id. at 5–7, 10–11. 
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governs all road vehicles within the United States.27 The NHTSA 
has the power to promulgate Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standards (“FMVSS”) with which vehicle manufacturers must 
certify compliance.28 Furthermore, even with the lack of FMVSS 
standards for self-driving vehicles, 29  the NHTSA still has the 
“authority to identify safety defects, allowing the [NHTSA] to 
recall vehicles or equipment that pose an unreasonable risk to 
safety.”30 This is important because it creates a potential safeguard 
against defective and dangerous vehicles being operated while the 
federal government is still trying to issue regulations for these new 
vehicles. 
In addition, with the high degree of wireless technologies31 in 
self-driving vehicles, the FTC will be a major player that will need 
to work in conjunction with the NHTSA to achieve strong 
regulations for self-driving vehicles.32 The FTC will operate in a 
consulting capacity for cybersecurity standards 33  and cyber 
dashboard 34  rulemaking and will hold primary rulemaking 
authority on the privacy standards35 for self-driving vehicles. 
                                                
 27 49 U.S.C. § 105 (2016). 
 28 49 U.S.C. § 30101 (2016). 
 29 The current statutory definition for a motor vehicle does not include any 
provision for self-driving vehicles. The current definition for “‘motor vehicle’ 
means a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured 
primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways [.]” See id. § 30102. 
 30 U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 21, at 7. 
 31  See Dorothy J. Glancy, Sharing the Road: Smart Transportation 
Infrastructure, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1617, 1627–40 (2014) (discussing 
connected vehicle technologies and how the USDOT “recognizes two main 
categories or types of vehicular communications: (1) Connected Vehicles Safety 
Systems that use Dedicated Short Range Communications (“DSRC”) 
transceivers to send and receive vehicle status communications; and (2) 
Connected Vehicle Mobility Applications that generally use cellular wireless to 
send and receive a wide range of data, from the status of the vehicle, to 
navigation assistance and infotainment”). 
 32 The U.S. Senate recognizes the importance of the FTC as a cohort in 
formulating regulations, which is evidenced by the inclusion of the FTC in the 
SPY Car Act. See Security and Privacy in Your Car Act of 2015, S. 1806, 114th 
Cong. 2, 5–8, 10–11 (2015). 
 33 Id. at 5. 
 34 Id. at 7. The “cyber dashboard” is essentially an affixed notice on a 
manufactured vehicle which contains information for the consumer regarding 
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As discussed previously, self-driving vehicles will rely on 
some form of communication and operating technology that will 
utilize the Internet..36 Because no current regulation establishes 
privacy standards for these vehicles, this Recent Development will 
analyze the SPY Car Act using the lens of the Fair Information 
Practices (“FIPs”). The FIPs were created by the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare “in response to growing use of 
automated data systems containing information about 
individuals.”37 The FIPs are highly influential guidelines in privacy 
laws that have been cited by the FTC in relation to its regulatory 
authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”). 
A. The Fair Information Practices 
The FTC, considered a major actor in U.S. privacy regulation, 
issued a report to Congress in 1998 that laid out what the FTC 
called the “five core principles of privacy protection: (1) 
Notice/Awareness; (2) Choice/Consent; (3) Access/Participation; 
(4) Integrity/Security; and (5) Enforcement/Redress.”38 Although, 
historically, the United States’ privacy laws have not consistently 
reflected these core principles,39 the “FIPs are important because 
they provide the underlying policy for many national laws 
addressing privacy and data protection matters.”40 This section 
analyzes the privacy portion of the SPY Car Act against the FIPs to 
determine if the SPY Car Act will be successful in accomplishing 
                                                                                                         
the measures the vehicle takes to protect the cybersecurity and privacy of the 
vehicle and the consumer. 
 35 Id. at 10. 
 36 See RAND, supra note 4. 
 37 Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History, 2 (Version 
2.17 2016). See also Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, a report of 
the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems U.S. 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, July 1973 DHEW Publication 
No. (OS) 73-94. 
 38  Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress 7 
(1998). 
 39 See Gellman, supra note 37, at 1 (“Privacy laws in the United States, which 
are much less comprehensive in scope than laws in some other countries, often 
reflect some elements of FIPs but not as consistently as the laws of most other 
nations.”). 
 40 Id. 
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its stated purpose. The following subsections will go into greater 
detail on the five FIPs and will illustrate how each individual 
principle is relevant to self-driving vehicle technology. 
1. Notice/Awareness 
The first and “most fundamental principle” is notice.41 The 
FTC states “consumers should be given notice of an entity’s 
information practices before any personal information is collected 
from them.”42 This principle is relevant to self-driving cars because 
of the high value of the information gathered by the vehicle and the 
possibility that data obtained from the vehicle could potentially 
contain personal data regarding the passengers.43 The FTC states 
that “[w]ithout notice, a consumer cannot make an informed 
decision as to whether and to what extent to disclose personal 
information.” 44  A consumer’s decision to disclose personal 
information might be made for them, without notice, as the nature 
of the data collected by the vehicle will reveal some personal 
information about the vehicle’s passengers.45 
2. Choice/Consent 
The second FIP is consumer choice or consent.46 The FTC 
defines “choice” as “giving consumers options as to how any 
personal information collected from them may be used.”47 The 
Federal Automated Vehicles Policy states that manufacturers 
should “offer vehicle owners choices regarding the collection, use, 
sharing, retention, and deconstruction of data, including 
geolocation,48 biometric, and driver behavior data that could be 
                                                
 41 Federal Trade Commission, supra note 38, at 7. 
 42 Id. 
 43 RAND, supra note 4, at 94. See also Gillespie, supra note 19. 
 44 Federal Trade Commission, supra note 38. 
 45  Consumers want the ability to “use a personal smartphone to obtain data 
for navigation, to have email read aloud to the driver, to send SMS (text) 
messages by voice, and to have text messages read back aloud for the driver.” 
Having all of this information stored in a vehicle shows how sensitive this data 
could be. See RAND, supra note 4, at 82. 
 46 Federal Trade Commission, supra note 38, at 8. 
 47 Id. 
 48  Geolocation, TECHOPEDIA, 
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/1935/geolocation (last visited Feb. 22, 
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reasonably linked to them personally (i.e., personal data).”49 A 
consumer’s choice as to how their driving data may be shared is 
especially relevant to self-driving vehicles because many third 
parties will be interested in the data.50 
3. Access/Participation 
The third FIP is that consumers should have the “ability both to 
access data about him or herself—i.e., to view the data in an 
entity’s files—and to contest that data’s accuracy and 
completeness.”51 This particular FIP is important for self-driving 
vehicles because consumers should have access to the information 
their vehicle is collecting about them. Consumers may want to 
view what particular types of information are being gathered by the 
vehicle to better inform their decision as to whether they want the 
manufacturer to have control over their data or not. Furthermore, 
the FTC addresses access and participation to make sure 
consumers can correct data that is obtained from them.52 In regards 
to self-driving vehicles, however, access and participation should 
be viewed in a light that reflects the importance of a consumer’s 
knowledge of the nature of the information gathered from them. It 
is only through this light that consumers can make informed 
decisions about whether they want the data retained from them or 
not. 
                                                                                                         
2017) (“Geolocation is the process of finding, determining and providing the 
exact location of a computer, networking device, or equipment. It enables device 
location based on geographical coordinates and measurements.”). In the self-
driving vehicle scenario, the consumer should have a choice as to whether the 
manufacturer has the ability to tell exactly where the consumer’s vehicle is at all 
times based on geographical information taken from the vehicles Global 
Positioning System (“GPS”). 
 49 U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 21, at 19. 
 50 RAND, supra note 4, at 94 (stating that “insurance companies would be 
interested in individual driving habits,” “retailers would be very interested in 
attracting motorists to their locations,” and “law enforcement agencies [would] 
have considerable interest in using such data”). 
 51 Federal Trade Commission, supra note 38, at 9. 
 52 Id. 
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4. Integrity/Security 
The fourth FIP is “that data be accurate and secure.”53 The FTC 
promulgates that to “assure data integrity,” data “collectors must 
take reasonable steps, such as using only reputable sources of data 
and cross-referencing data against multiple sources, providing 
consumer access to data, and destroying untimely data or 
converting it to anonymous form.”54 This definition is important 
because it draws attention to the protection of data from hackers; 
however it only speaks to information and does not address the 
issue of security in regards to the software components of the 
vehicle and the vehicle’s operating system. 55  The Federal 
Automated Vehicles Policy suggests that the manufacturers should 
take it upon themselves to ensure that they “follow a robust 
product development process” that is designed to detect and adapt 
to cybersecurity threats.56 While precedent exists regarding the 
protection of data within the vehicle, there is no established 
standard for the quality of a vehicles’ cybersecurity against 
infiltration.57 
5. Enforcement/Redress 
The final FIP is enforcement and redress.58 This particular FIP 
is important because without a means of enforcement, the other 
FIPs would be worthless.59 The FTC states that there are different 
ways for the FIPs to be enforced. 60  The industry could self-
regulate, “legislation [could] create private remedies for 
consumers,”61 or there could be “regulatory schemes enforceable 
                                                
 53 Id. at 10. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 21, at 21. 
 57 Id. (telling industry participants that they “should consider and incorporate 
guidance, best practices, and design principles published by National Institute 
for Standard and Technology (NIST), NHTSA, SAE International, the Alliance 
of Automobile Manufacturers, the Association of Global Automakers, the 
Automotive Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) and other relevant 
organizations”). 
 58 Federal Trade Commission, supra note 38, at 10. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
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through civil and criminal sanctions.” 62  Enforcement is an 
interesting issue in the current self-driving vehicle industry 
because manufacturers are currently regulating their own vehicle 
standards with little to no oversight by any level of government.63 
The FTC recognizes that government enforcement is an option for 
regulating the implementation of the FIPs and this is reflected in 
the SPY Car Act.64 
B. Federal Trade Commission Act 
In response to an increased demand for regulation of unfair and 
deceptive business practices,65 the United States Congress enacted 
the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”).66 The FTC receives 
its regulatory power from Section 5 of the FTCA,67 which allows 
the FTC to “prevent” businesses “from using unfair methods of 
                                                
 62 Id. 
 63 Very few states have enacted some form of legislation to address the issues 
of self-driving vehicles. Most states that have passed legislation deal with the 
problem of defining a self-driving vehicle and authorizing this type of vehicle to 
be operated on the roads within the states. See U.S. Department of 
Transportation, supra note 21, at 41–52; see also, Autonomous Vehicles | Self-
Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-self-driving-
vehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (showing a 
constantly updated list of every state that has passed legislation and every state 
with proposed legislation regarding self-driving vehicles). 
 64 Security and Privacy in Your Car Act of 2015, S. 1806, 114th Cong. 10 
(2015) (“Enforcement—A violation of this section shall be treated as an unfair 
and deceptive act or practice in violation of a rule prescribed under section 
18(a)(1)(B).”). 
 65  See Daniel J. Solove, A Brief History of Information Privacy Law, 
PROSKUER ON PRIVACY, PLI (2006) (providing an in-depth history of the 
evolution of privacy law and how the FTCA emerged based on the need to 
regulate unfair and deceptive business practices). 
 66 See 15 U.S.C. § 41-58 (2012). See also Jeffrey H. Liebling, Judicial 
Usurpation of the F.T.C.’s Authority: A Return to the Rule of Reason, 30 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 283, 286 (1996) (explaining how “[t]he primary objective of 
the F.T.C. Act was to create an administrative body with broad regulatory 
authority to determine what business practices constituted unfair methods of 
competition”). 
 67 15 U.S.C. § 45 is referred to as Section 5 of the FTCA because the FTCA 
starts at § 41 making § 45 the fifth section. 
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competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices in or affecting commerce.”68 The ability to prevent 
businesses from committing unfair and deceptive practices is 
solely a reactive authority and does not give the FTC the power to 
issue statutory regulations.69 The SPY Car Act, however, would 
give the FTC the authority to issue regulations under the FTCA 
pertaining to privacy standards and would make a violation of 
these standards an “unfair and deceptive act or practice” under the 
FTCA.70 This dual authority given to the FTC authorizes the FTC 
to assume a role it historically has not embraced.71 Part IV will 
analyze how this dual authority gives the FTC the power it needs 
to effectively regulate the privacy standards for self-driving 
vehicles. 
1. The FTC’s Authority Under Section 5 of the FTCA 
If the FTC determines that a manufacturer has been deceptive 
or has used unfair business practices, the FTC can bring an 
enforcement action through filing a lawsuit in federal court.72 The 
FTC, however, conducts the majority of their regulatory power 
outside the purviews of the courts.73 In its role as a regulatory 
                                                
 68 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012). 
 69 The FTCA gives the FTC the authority to issue complaints against a 
company who has violated its privacy policies. Id. The FTCA, however, does 
not give the FTC the power to issue statutory regulations to which the 
companies must conform their privacy practices. See id. at § 45(b). 
 70 The SPY Car Act states that the FTC will have the power to “prescribe 
regulations . . . to carry out section 27” of the FTCA. Security and Privacy in 
Your Car Act of 2015, S. 1806, 114th Cong. 10 (2015). 
 71 See Solove, supra note 65, at 39 (stating that the FTC, since 1998, has been 
“bring[ing] civil actions and seek[ing] injunctive remedies”). 
 72 See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and 
Law Enforcement Authority, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority (last visited 
March 4, 2017) [hereinafter Federal Trade Commission: A Brief Overview]. 
 73 Id. Typically the only time companies refuse to settle and take the FTC to 
court is when the company believes the FTC has overstepped the scope of its 
statutory authority under Section 5 of the FTCA. See also Spencer Weber 
Waller, Prosecution By Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust 
Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1394–95 (1998) (explaining how the courts 
have mostly taken on a “symbolic role” in overseeing the FTC in their 
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agency, the FTC monitors the marketplace and responds to 
complaints by initiating investigations, and if warranted, issues a 
complaint “setting forth its charges.”74 If the accused company 
continues to engage in the unlawful business practices or decides 
to contest the charges against them, the complaint is adjudicated 
and “a United States court of appeals may then enforce, modify or 
discharge the F.T.C. ruling.” 75  It is difficult, however, for a 
company to successfully challenge the FTC’s determination that 
the activity the company engaged in was unfair or deceptive. If the 
FTC’s findings are “supported by substantial evidence,” the court 
should dismiss the challenge in favor of the FTC “even if the 
finding is at variance with the position the court would have 
taken.”76 In other words, courts will not overturn a finding of 
“unfair or deceptive” as long as the FTC has substantial evidence 
to support their claim.77 If a company charged with violation of 
Section 5 of the FTCA wants to challenge the finding by the FTC, 
the company will usually challenge the FTC’s scope of authority 
under the FTCA.78 This is important because self-driving vehicle 
                                                                                                         
regulatory capacity and that the law “is determined in accordance with internal 
guidelines rather than case law”). 
 74  15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2006). See also What We Do, FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do (last visited Feb. 23, 
2017) (“We [the FTC] conduct investigations, sue companies and people that 
violate the law, develop rules to ensure a vibrant marketplace, and educate 
consumers and businesses about their rights and responsibilities.”). See also 
Federal Trade Commission: A Brief Overview, supra note 72. 
 75 Liebling, supra note 66, at 295. 
 76 Id. at 295–96 (citing Litton Industries, Inc. v. F.T.C., 676 F.2d 364, 368–69 
(9th Cir. 1982)). 
 77 Id. at 294–96. 
 78 The key word is “wants” to challenge the FTC. Companies will settle with 
the FTC out of court the majority of the time. See Enforcing Privacy Promises, 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-
resources/protecting-consumer-privacy/enforcing-privacy-promises (last visited 
March 4, 2017) (showing how many companies have settled with the FTC in the 
recent past). If a company does, however, want to challenge the finding of the 
FTC, the form of the challenge will typically look like the defenses raised in 
cases such as: LabMD, Inc. v. F.T.C., 776 F.3d 1275 (2015) (LabMD claiming 
the FTC exceeded their statutory authority; 11th Circuit ruled in LabMD’s 
favor); F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (2015) (determining 
whether the FTC had authority to regulate cybersecurity under the unfairness 
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manufacturers will be faced with complaints by the FTC if they 
breach their cybersecurity and data privacy standards as evidenced 
by the fact that the SPY Car Act makes a violation of the privacy 
standards a violation of the FTCA. 
2. Application of the FTC’s Section 5 Authority to Self-
Driving Vehicles 
The FTC’s ability to effectively determine what is an unfair or 
deceptive business practice is both developed by the FTC and 
tested in the federal courts. The unfairness prong, however, versus 
the deceptive prong, is currently the subject of controversy.79 The 
FTC typically pursues what they have determined to be a breach of 
cybersecurity under the unfairness prong while pursuing the breach 
of a commitment to a stated privacy policy under the deceptive 
prong.80 Therefore, if Congress is going to include the FTC in the 
rulemaking process for cybersecurity and privacy standards in self-
driving vehicles then it may need to revisit the issue of the FTC’s 
authority under the FTCA, particularly for cybersecurity. 81 
Effective regulation of these self-driving vehicles will require the 
FTC to monitor the companies manufacturing these vehicles to 
assure that they are complying with their stated privacy policies 
                                                                                                         
prong of Section 5 of the FTCA; ruled in favor of the FTC thereby expanding its 
scope of authority under the FTCA to regulate cybersecurity). The trend of the 
judiciary in FTC authority case decisions dates all the way back to the 1920s 
when the U.S. Supreme Court was first faced with this authority question. The 
Court issued a very strict interpretation of the FTC’s ability to determine what is 
unfair and deceptive in F.T.C. v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920). However, the 
Court methodically chipped away at this ruling and broadened the FTC’s 
authority until the 1980s where the Court once again ruled to restrict the scope 
of the FTC’s authority. Liebling’s article argues the courts are restricting the 
original intention of Congress in the FTCA and that the courts should look to 
once again broadening the FTC’s authority and allowing them to act like the 
regulatory agency they were designed to be. See Liebling, supra note 66, at 296-
313.  
 79 See Liebling, supra note 66, at 296–313. (discussing challenges to FTC 
authority and how all of these recent challenges have come after the FTC has 
tried to prosecute breach of cybersecurity standards under the unfairness prong 
of the FTCA). 
 80 See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common 
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 627–48 (2014). 
 81 See Liebling, supra note 66, at 313–18. 
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and not allowing consumers data to be stolen. Without clarity 
about the FTC’s ability to regulate self-driving vehicle 
manufacturers under Section 5, the consumer is ultimately the one 
who suffers because of the lack of oversight for manufacturers and 
their practices. 
The FTC, while not a rulemaking agency, has the ability to 
play an important role in the regulation of self-driving vehicle 
technology. The Senate included the FTC in the SPY Car Act to 
help the NHTSA create effective regulations. In order to do so, the 
NHTSA must account for the FIPs and the FTC’s own regulatory 
authority under the FTCA. 
III. THE SPY CAR ACT OF 2015 
Self-driving vehicles have created a unique problem for the 
federal government because the U.S. Department of Transportation 
has never encountered a technology with such a high degree of 
autonomy. Since its inception “the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (“DOT”) has been committed to saving lives and 
improving safety and efficiency in every way Americans move 
. . . .”82 This regulatory effort includes automobiles, which are “on 
the cusp of a technological transformation.” 83  As discussed 
previously, the current regulations on standard automobiles will 
not be adequate for the future regulation of self-driving vehicles.84 
The primary objective of the SPY Car Act is “[t]o protect 
consumers from security and privacy threats to their motor 
vehicles, and for other purposes.”85  This will be achieved by 
amending the current Title 49 powers of the DOT, NHTSA, and 
FTC to regulate these self-driving vehicles.86 The SPY Car Act is 
organized in a way that will amend the definitions section under 49 
U.S.C. § 30102 to include crucial definitions that pertain to self-
driving cars.87 The SPY Car Act then breaks the issues into three 
                                                
 82 U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 21, at 5. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See RAND, supra note 4. 
 85 SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 1. 
 86 See id.; 49 U.S.C. § 301 (1998). 
 87 See SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 2–3 (defining “Administrator” as the 
Administrator of the NHTSA; “Commission” as the FTC; “‘critical software 
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categories: cybersecurity, 88  cyber dashboard, 89  and privacy 
standards.90 This section details the SPY Car Act’s categories and 
explains these sections’ importance and purpose. 
A. Cybersecurity Standards 
The SPY Car Act’s first main section is “Cybersecurity 
standards.”91 The cybersecurity section starts off by making a 
definitive statement that “[a]ll motor vehicles manufactured for 
sale in the United States . . . shall comply with the cybersecurity 
standards set forth” in this section.92 The cybersecurity standards 
with which these vehicles must comply consist of three separate 
components: “protection against hacking,”93 “security of collected 
information,” 94  and “detection, reporting, and responding to 
hacking.”95 In addition to stating specific standards to which these 
vehicles must comply, the cybersecurity standards section also 
                                                                                                         
systems’ means software systems that can affect the driver’s control of the 
vehicle movement”; “‘driving data’ include, but are not limited to, any 
electronic information collected about—(A) a vehicle’s status, including, but not 
limited to, its location or speed; and (B) any owner, lessee, driver, or passenger 
of a vehicle”; “‘entry points’ include, but are not limited to, means by which – 
(A) driving data may be accessed, directly or indirectly; or (B) control signals 
may be sent or received either wirelessly or through wired connections”; and 
“‘hacking’ means the unauthorized access to electronic controls or driving data, 
either wirelessly or through wired connections”). 
 88 Id. at 3. 
 89 Id. at 6. 
 90 Id. at 8. 
 91 Id. at 3. As mentioned in the introduction, it is beyond the scope of this 
Recent Development to analyze the cybersecurity standards portion of the SPY 
Car Act from a technical perspective. However, it is worthwhile to touch on 
what is said about cybersecurity standards within the SPY Car Act. The 
cybersecurity portion of the SPY Car Act is a deep enough issue to warrant its 
own recent development. The area of cybersecurity law is a very murky area of 
the law and is still in the process of developing and evolving to meet the needs 
of a rapidly changing technology industry. 
 92 Id. 
 93 SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 3–4. 
 94 Id. at 4–5. 
 95 Id. at 5. 
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calls for “penalties” of “not more than $5,000 for each violation” 
of these regulations.96 
The SPY Car Act gives the primary rulemaking authority for 
cybersecurity standards to the NHTSA after consultation with the 
FTC.97 It is this relationship between the NHTSA and the FTC that 
makes the analysis of whether the SPY Car Act conforms to the 
FTC’s reliance on the FIPs so important. These regulations in the 
SPY Car Act do not necessarily inform the industry participants as 
to the specific standards to which these cybersecurity measures 
must comply. Rather, the SPY Car Act only specifies that each 
manufactured vehicle must have some sort of protection against 
hacking, and the vehicle must have measures to prevent 
unauthorized access to the vehicle.98 
B. Cyber Dashboard 
The SPY Car Act’s “Cyber Dashboard” is a means of giving 
notice to consumers of self-driving vehicles.99 A cyber dashboard 
is a privacy policy notice affixed to the self-driving vehicle.100 The 
features of the cyber dashboard must “inform consumers, through 
an easy-to-understand, standardized graphic, about the extent to 
which the motor vehicle protects the cybersecurity and privacy of 
motor vehicle owners, lessees, drivers, and passengers.”101 The 
cyber dashboard must contain provisions “beyond the minimum 
requirements set forth in” the cybersecurity portion of the SPY Car 
Act and it must go beyond the requirements set forth “in section 27 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.”102 
This language contained in the SPY Car Act concerning notice 
does not entirely entail the requirements promulgated in the 
FIPs.103 Although the cyber dashboard does effectively give notice 
as to how the vehicle will protect the privacy of the consumer, it 
                                                
 96 Id. 
 97 See id. at 3–6. 
 98 See id. 
 99 SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 7. 
 100 Id. at 6–7. 
 101 Id. at 7. 
 102 Id. 
 103 See id. at 7–8. 
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does not address the issues of consent, consumer access, or third 
party access.104 While these issues are discussed in the Privacy 
Standards portion of the SPY Car Act,105 the U.S. Senate should 
look to including these requirements in the initial notice, the cyber 
dashboard, so that consumers can be fully informed as to how their 
data is being used and the rights the consumer has to this 
disposition of their data. 
C. Privacy Standards for Motor Vehicles 
The final portion of the SPY Car Act concerns “Privacy 
Standards for Motor Vehicles.”106 The purpose of this portion of 
the SPY Car Act is not only to give the FTC the power to regulate 
privacy standards and to issue statutory rules on privacy standards, 
but also to provide a framework for privacy standards to which 
self-driving vehicle manufacturers may be held. These standards 
incorporate the FIPs by using “transparency,” “consumer control,” 
and “limitations on use of personal driving information.”107 The 
SPY Car Act defines “transparency” as the “vehicle [providing] 
clear and conspicuous notice, in clear and plain language, to the 
owners or lessees of such vehicle of the collection, transmission, 
retention, and use of driving data collected from such motor 
vehicle.”108 The SPY Car Act defines “consumer control” as the 
ability of the consumer to opt-out of “the collection and retention 
of driving data” without losing “access to navigation tools or other 
features or capabilities, to the extent technically possible.”109 The 
SPY Car Act also states that a “manufacturer (including an original 
equipment manufacturer) may not use any information collected by 
a motor vehicle for advertising or marketing purposes without the 
affirmative express consent by the owner or lessee” unless 
provided with the owner’s consent.110 
                                                
 104 See id. at 7. 
 105 See SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 8–11. 
 106 Id. at 8. 
 107 Id. at 8–11. 
 108 Id. at 8. 
 109 Id. at 8–9. 
 110 Id. at 9–10. 
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These provisions within the SPY Car Act accurately reflect the 
FIPs by requiring self-driving vehicle manufacturers to take the 
necessary steps to fully inform the consumer as to how their data is 
being used and giving the consumer control over their data.111 
These provisions are crucial for the effective regulation of self-
driving vehicles because they allow a consumer to dictate how 
their data can be used. 
Overall, the language of the SPY Car Act produces regulations 
that will effectuate the necessary regulation of self-driving 
vehicles. The SPY Car Act’s most valuable tool is that it sets a 
solid groundwork that the NHTSA and the FTC can use to further 
promulgate rules. The next part further analyzes the provisions of 
the SPY Car Act and determines whether they are adequate as 
compared to existing privacy standards. 
IV. WILL THE SPY CAR ACT HELP RESOLVE THE LEGAL 
ISSUES SURROUNDING PRIVACY IN A SELF-DRIVING CAR? 
With so much talk about the concerns surrounding vehicle 
cybersecurity and privacy, the question now becomes, will the 
SPY Car Act help to alleviate these concerns? The purpose of the 
SPY Car Act is not only to provide rules and regulations for self-
driving vehicles, but also to allocate rule-making authority to the 
NHTSA in conjunction with the FTC.112 It is through this lens that 
the analysis of the provisions of the SPY Car Act will take place. 
While there may be portions of the SPY Car Act that could use 
some bolstering, the NHTSA and the FTC have the opportunity to 
compensate for any shortcomings by continuing to analyze the 
needs of the industry and consumers and reflecting that in the final 
rules published by both entities. Subsection A will analyze the 
cyber dashboard, notice requirements, and transparency against the 
FIPs and will argue for more transparency in the initial notice 
requirement. Subsection B will analyze the limitations on the use 
of driving data by manufacturers and how the requirements align 
with the current practices within the self-driving vehicle industry. 
Subsection C will scrutinize the authority given to the FTC through 
                                                
 111 See SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 8–11. 
 112 Id. at 5–11. 
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the SPY Car Act to regulate privacy practices and how this aligns 
with the current ability of the FTC to regulate the industry. 
Subsection D will analyze the statutory rulemaking process that the 
FTC will be required to use and whether that process will be 
adequate in obtaining valuable input from consumers. Subsection 
E will address the lack of private remedies associated with 
companies’ breach of their policy agreements and how the SPY 
Car Act has addressed this issue. 
A. Notice and Transparency 
The “cyber dashboard,” or an affixed notice on the vehicle, and 
the notice requirement contained in the privacy standards, are 
effective regulations contained within the SPY Car Act.113 The 
Federal Automated Vehicles Policy suggests a notice 
requirement, 114  and the FTC requires notice be given to 
consumers. 115  Thus, the SPY Car Act’s requirement for 
manufacturers to give their customers notice is a step in the right 
direction. The notice requirement also will likely meet FTC 
standards because of the additional requirements of transparency, 
control, and limitations on the use, collection, and retention of the 
personal data.116 These requirements are consistent with the FIPs 
and should be effective in stemming some of the concerns over 
data privacy within these vehicles. 
There is an argument to be made, however, that notice of a 
manufacturer’s privacy practices will not be effective enough to 
ensure that consumers are fully informed about companies’ 
practices and the level of protection of the data. 117  Tesla’s 
Customer Privacy Policy is a great example of a privacy notice 
given to consumers of self-driving vehicles.118 While it can be 
                                                
 113 Id. at 6–8. 
 114 U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 21, at 19. 
 115 Federal Trade Commission, supra note 38, at 7. 
 116 SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 8–11. 
 117 See generally Paula J. Bruening & Mary J. Culnan, Through a Glass 
Darkly: From Privacy Notices to Effective Transparency, 17 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 
515 (2016). 
 118 Tesla, Legal: Customer Privacy Policy, https://www.tesla.com/about/legal 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2017). 
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argued that Tesla should be lauded for its detailed privacy notice, it 
is unlikely that the average consumer will understand the lengthy 
legal document. 119  The SPY Car Act requires that “easy-to-
understand”120 language be used in the cyber dashboard feature and 
that consumers should be given “clear and conspicuous notice.”121 
This provision will force manufacturers to trim down the 
complicated language and will help consumers better understand 
the privacy implications of self-driving vehicles. 
The FTC will need to closely monitor privacy policies to 
ensure that the industry is conforming to the standards contained in 
the SPY Car Act. The SPY Car Act incorporates the FIPs by 
requiring straightforward language in privacy notices and those 
requirements will, in theory, diminish the amount of complicated 
language consumers will be forced to read. In reality, however, this 
regularly will not be the case because manufacturers have an 
interest in covering all aspects of legality and liability, which 
results in overly technical and detailed privacy notices. 122 
Therefore, the FTC needs to take this into account in their proposal 
for rulemaking for privacy standards. In addition to the FTC’s 
ability to intervene when a company has not complied with its own 
stated privacy policy,123 the FTC must safeguard consumers from 
convoluted privacy notices by enforcing the cyber dashboard and 
privacy provisions laid out in the SPY Car Act. 
                                                
 119 See id. (“Telematics log data: To improve our vehicles and services for 
you, we may collect certain telematics data regarding the performance, usage, 
operation, and condition of your Tesla vehicle, including the following: e.g., 
vehicle identification number; speed information; odometer readings; battery use 
management information; battery charging history; electrical system functions; 
software version information; infotainment system data; safety-related data and 
camera images.”) This lengthy description covers only one facet of the 
information Tesla retains. The average consumer probably would not notice that 
information regarding your “infotainment” is collected. See also Bruening & 
Culnan, supra note 117, at 526–29. 
 120 SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 7. 
 121 Id. at 8. 
 122 Bruening & Culnan, supra note 117, at 543. 
 123 Solove, supra note 65, at 39. 
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B. Limitations on Use of Driving Data 
Another regulation that would create a solid foundation from 
which the NHTSA and FTC could work is the limitation on the use 
of the collected driving data.124 With constant Internet connection, 
Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) like Verizon, AT&T, IBM, and 
Google will have access to the personal data generated by self-
driving vehicles.125 These ISPs will provide the Internet broadband 
on which self-driving vehicle technology will rely, 126  thus 
introducing yet another party who has access to the information 
gathered from the vehicle and transmitted over broadband. While 
the SPY Car Act regulations may limit the manufacturer’s use of 
data, there is an open question as to what choices a consumer has 
regarding the information retained by ISPs. Although the SPY Car 
Act does not speak directly to this question, the FTC does have 
advisory authority and should seek to apply the FIPs to all parties 
involved in self-driving vehicle operation.127 
While this may seem like a vulnerability, the SPY Car Act 
shows that it is aware of the concern over secondary uses of 
personal information.128 The language included in the SPY Car Act 
limiting a manufacturer’s use of personal driving data has the 
regulations moving in the right direction.129 While Congress does 
                                                
 124 SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 9–10. 
 125 See RAND, supra note 4, at 158 (stating how self-driving vehicle “security 
needs to be in the ‘cloud’” and noting that “only a cloud-based solution could 
manage all of the media and data involved in” a self-driving vehicle). 
 126 See id. at 82 (explaining that in order for self-driving vehicles to operate 
effectively on a horizontal communications platform there needs to be 3 
components that work together: “(1) the car, (2) the technology brought into the 
car, and (3) the Internet ‘cloud’”). 
 127 The FTC states that “choice relates to secondary uses of information—i.e., 
uses beyond those necessary to complete the contemplated transaction.” The 
FTC also states that one secondary use of this information could be “transfer of 
information to third parties.” See Federal Trade Commission, supra note 38, at 
8. 
 128 See SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 8–10. This is evidenced by the fact that 
the SPY Car Act includes language giving the consumer control over the 
“collection and retention of driving data” and the fact that the SPY Car Act also 
limits manufacturers as to what they can do with the data without express 
consent from the consumer. 
 129 See id. 
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effectively establish limitations on use of information by the 
manufacturer, Congress should seek to include strong language in 
the SPY Car Act that gives the FTC authority to govern 
information sharing with every potential party involved in the 
operation of a self-driving vehicle.130 That the SPY Car Act does 
not address the idea that an Internet medium may have access to 
consumer information shows the need for additional language 
consistent with the choice/consent FIP where the consumer has the 
option to restrict information access to all parties.131 
The privacy policy used by Tesla gives some insight in to how 
current manufacturers are addressing information sharing. 132 
Tesla’s privacy policy aligns with the provisions of the SPY Car 
Act in that it says that they “do not share information that 
personally identifies you [the consumer] with unaffiliated third 
parties for their marketing purposes unless you [the consumer] opt 
in to that sharing.” 133  This language is consistent with the 
limitations imposed by the SPY Car Act.134 The FTC, however, 
uses stronger language in the FIPs that suggests manufacturers, or 
any company retaining consumer information, should not share 
any consumer information to any secondary entity without consent 
from the consumer. 135  It may not be feasible, as self-driving 
                                                
 130 See SPY Car Act, supra note 8. The FTC, through its rulemaking capacity 
under the SPY Car Act, needs to work with consumers and the industry so they 
can anticipate what these “secondary uses” could take the form of. This may 
come to light as self-driving vehicle technologies become more sophisticated, 
however, the FTC should strive to identify potential additional entities that may 
need governance. 
 131 See Federal Trade Commission, supra note 38, at 8. 
 132 Tesla, supra note 118. 
 133 Id. 
 134 SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 9. 
 135  Federal Trade Commission, supra note 38, at 8–9 (explaining how 
“secondary uses can be internal, such as placing the consumer on the collecting 
company’s mailing list in order to market additional products or promotions, or 
external, such as transfer of information to third parties”). The FTC also speaks 
to a system of allowing consumers to “opt-in” or “opt-out” of having their data 
retained with the ability of the consumer to specifically “tailor the nature of the 
information they reveal and the uses to which it will be put.” Id. The FTC also 
states that in the online realm, choice can be easily “exercised by simply 
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technology is new and evolving, to completely restrict 
manufacturers such as Tesla from sharing information about their 
drivers.136 Tesla’s privacy policy, however, includes provisions that 
appear vague and would leave a consumer wondering with whom 
their data is being shared. 137  Because of these vague terms 
contained in privacy policies coupled with the need for 
manufacturers to have the ability to data share, the FTC, through 
its rulemaking authority needs to strive to create a data sharing 
system that works for both consumers and manufacturers. Taking 
into account the FIPs and the Federal Autonomous Vehicle Policy 
Guidance, the FTC should create a system where the consumer can 
specifically tailor the data they wish to be shared and 
manufacturers are required to de-identify the data even when 
shared with other parties.138 
C. Enforcement Authority Given to the FTC Under the FTCA 
The SPY Car Act gives the FTC primary rulemaking authority 
for privacy standards and makes a violation of the privacy 
standards “an unfair and deceptive act or practice” under the 
FTCA.139 Giving this type of dual authority provides the FTC with 
the requisite tools to effectively regulate the privacy standards in 
self-driving vehicles. This provision of the SPY Car Act is 
                                                                                                         
clicking a box on the computer screen that indicates a user’s decision with 
respect to the use and/or dissemination of the information being collected.” Id. 
 136 See U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 21, at 18 (suggesting a 
system of anonymous data sharing that would promote “data sharing to enhance 
and extend safety benefits . . . [s]uch shared data would help to accelerate 
knowledge and understanding of HAV performance, and could be used to 
enhance the safety of HAV [self-driving vehicle] systems and to establish 
consumer confidence in [self-driving vehicle technologies]”). 
 137 See Tesla, supra note 118 (stating that Tesla “may share information with 
our service providers and business partners when necessary to perform services 
on our or on your behalf” with no mention of whether you have control over 
these disclosures”). Tesla also lays out a list of “third party service providers and 
channel partners” with whom they may share information. Id. Tesla does give an 
opt-in option for certain types of third parties, however, Tesla also includes 
language that could lead a consumer to believe they have no choice as to 
whether their information is shared with certain types of entities. 
 138 See supra note 135. 
 139 SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 10. 
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important because it eradicates any ambiguity as to whether 
privacy violations will fall under the current FTC authority within 
the FTCA. As discussed in Part II,140 the FTC has relied on case 
law to shape the scope of its authority to regulate cybersecurity and 
privacy standards. 141  By explicitly stating that the FTC can 
prosecute a violation, Congress has given the FTC the power it 
needs to operate as a federal enforcement agency as Congress 
originally intended.142 
D. A Clear Avenue for Industry Input 
Another area of concern surrounding the SPY Car Act is the 
tension it may generate between the industry participants and the 
power of regulation created in the NHTSA and the FTC. This 
tension can be seen in other types of industries, such as the current 
vehicle industry, and the self-driving vehicle industry should not, 
theoretically, have much of a problem with government 
oversight.143 The SPY Car Act refers to industry “best security 
practices” and addresses how the self-driving vehicle industry 
should use these best practices to test the cybersecurity of the 
vehicle. 144  Because the technology is still new and relatively 
untested, the federal government will need to collaborate with the 
industry so the regulations reflect the actual best practices of the 
industry and the safest measures for the consumer. 
The SPY Car Act initiates this public collaboration by 
requiring the FTC to issue regulations “in accordance with section 
553 of title 5, United States Code.”145 This particular rulemaking 
statute would require the FTC to publish a notice of proposed rule 
making in the Federal Register, and the notice must include 
                                                
 140 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 141 Regulation of cybersecurity under the unfairness prong is the prong that is 
being challenged more often. Regulation of privacy standards under the 
deceptive prong is relatively settled, and most companies charged with a 
violation of their privacy policy will typically settle with the FTC and pay civil 
penalties. See supra note 78.  
 142 See Liebling, supra note 66, at 283. 
 143 See RAND, supra note 4, at XXII. 
 144 SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 4. 
 145 Id. at 10–11; 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
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logistical details for public hearings on the rule, the “legal 
authority” proposing the rule, and the subject matter covered by 
the rule.146 These statutory requirements will give the FTC an 
opportunity to interact with the industry participants and obtain 
valuable information from them, which, in turn, will improve the 
quality of final regulations published by the FTC. 147  Strictly 
following the statutory guidelines, however, may not be enough to 
illicit adequate input from the average consumer interested in 
owning a self-driving vehicle.148 
An effective way to obtain industry and consumer input on 
privacy regulations is, in addition to following the statutory 
requirements laid out in 5 U.S.C. § 553, to create a webpage under 
the FTC and NHTSA government websites so consumers and 
industry players can comment on what seems to work and what 
does not work for privacy regulations. This webpage could be 
updated with proposals from the FTC and NHTSA and allow 
comments on those particular proposals before implementing them. 
The prevalence of self-driving vehicles is evidence that society is 
becoming increasingly technologically advanced.149 Therefore, the 
FTC should use a more technologically advanced solution for 
obtaining valuable input from consumers such as a website or 
social media postings about proposals and rules. 
E. Lack of Redress for Consumers 
One staggering deficiency in the SPY Car Act is the lack of 
redress for consumers. The FIPs speak to the importance of redress 
and how there are multiple ways to seek redress and enforcement 
                                                
 146 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
 147 U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 21, at 49–50. Although the 
U.S. DOT is analyzing NHTSA rulemaking the analysis is the same for the 
proposed rulemaking for the FTC under the SPY Car Act. The U.S. DOT states 
that “[r]ulemaking generally takes the longest . . . but it enables the Agency to 
make the broadest and most thorough changes to governing regulations, and 
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for consumers could be established.150 The most effective way to 
do so would be to establish “private rights of action for consumers 
harmed by an entity’s unfair information practices.”151 The FTC 
states that creating private remedies for consumers there would 
provide “strong incentives for entities to adopt and implement” the 
FIPs and would “ensure compensation for individuals harmed by 
misuse of their personal information.”152 The specific form of these 
remedies would be something that would need to be expanded 
upon later; just adding redress language to the SPY Car Act could 
strengthen the self-driving vehicle industry and could lead to 
increased consumer comfort in buying a self-driving car. 
A remedy for breach of the privacy standards, however, would 
fall under the powers of the FTC under the FTCA to “seek 
consumer redress from the” company who caused the injury to the 
consumer.153 Therefore, it does not seem that it would be difficult 
to pursue redress on behalf of consumers who were injured by a 
self-driving vehicle manufacturer that has breached its privacy 
policy because that area of the FTC’s authority is so settled. 
However, there may be an issue as to what types of redress would 
be associated with a breach of the vehicle’s cybersecurity, which 
carries higher risk of injury. Even though the SPY Car Act does 
not address a specific remedy for consumers, by making a breach 
of the privacy standards an “unfair and deceptive act or practice” 
under the FTCA, Congress has effectively created a type of 
remedy for consumers operating through the FTC.154 
V. CONCLUSION 
The SPY Car Act is an effective first step in establishing 
industry standards for self-driving vehicle security and privacy. 
There are many questions left unanswered, and this intersection 
between technology and the law presents a unique challenge to 
lawmakers, industry participants, and consumers. The SPY Car 
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Act does many things well, and due to the complete lack of 
existing regulations, the SPY Car Act creates the necessary avenue 
for the federal government to catch up to self-driving technology. 
Among the positive aspects of the SPY Car Act, it ensures that 
manufacturers abide by certain rules and regulations by attaching 
civil penalties to violations155 and more closely follows the original 
FIPs promulgated by the FTC. The SPY Car Act also provides 
consumers with an avenue for redress against companies that 
violate their stated privacy policies. The high value of the 
information these self-driving vehicles will contain calls for a 
stringent system of governance over self-driving vehicle 
manufacturers, and by making a violation of the privacy standards 
contained in the SPY Car Act fall under the prosecutorial authority 
of the FTC, Congress has provided the FTC with the power it 
needs to govern this technology. 
The SPY Car Act says that its purpose is to “protect consumers 
from security and privacy threats to their motor vehicles” and the 
SPY Car Act does make an adequate attempt to do this.156 The SPY 
Car Act does many things well; nonetheless, Congress needs to 
address its negative attributes with expediency. The disconnect 
between the industry and those that seek to regulate the industry 
must be addressed. Without communication between key industry 
players and government regulators, these self-driving vehicles 
could create an insurmountable burden that could prevent the 
industry from ever crossing the starting line. The notice of 
proposed rulemaking is a very good tool the FTC can use to 
effectuate communication between the industry, government, and 
consumers. This notice of proposed rulemaking needs to be 
bolstered by a more technologically advanced method of 
commenting on proposed rules. By making the rulemaking process 
more user friendly, the FTC could illicit more helpful input from 
consumers, and a greater number of consumers would have an 
opportunity to have their voice heard. 
Overall, the SPY Car Act has the potential to help standardize 
practices that desperately need cohesion. From consumers’ rights 
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to the industry’s business interests to the government’s regulatory 
interests, the issue of self-driving vehicle technology is far from 
being resolved. It is going to take a concerted effort among 
consumers, the industry, and the government to create unassailable 
vehicles that are safe and protect consumer privacy. After all, the 
benefits of these vehicles have the potential to shape the future of 
transportation for the United States. 
 
